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RETHINKING CRIME LEGISLATION:
HISTORY AND HARSHNESS
V. F. Nourse*
There is a truth about the criminal law that scholars evade as much as they
criticize: the criminal law is produced by legislators (rather than the experts).
Personally, I do not know of any way to make law in a democracy other than
through the voters' representatives. And, yet, it is the standard pose of the
criminal law scholar to denigrate legislatures and politicians as vindictive,
hysterical, or stupid.' All of these things may be true but name-calling is a poor
substitute for analysis. As in constitutional law,2 so too in criminal law, it is time
to put contempt aside and begin the process of understanding the history and the
institutional dynamics of our nation's crime legislation.
This is not a claim that the process is wise or rational; in fact, my present
hunch is that the legislative process is subject to regular, cycling malfunction. My
point is that we need to consider deeper questions-we need to ask whether
legislative malfunctions are built into the political system. In other words, we
need to turn to history, and specifically the history of crime legislation in the
United States, to get a sense of its patterns over time. Here, I offer preliminary
support for the claim that wars on crime-at least as political and legislative
phenomena-are not new, nor post-World War II, phenomena as they are
conventionally viewed.3 At a minimum, this evidence should prompt us to ask
* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin School of Law.
1. For an example of such a critique, see e.g. William J. Chambliss, Power, Politics, and Crime ch. 1
(Westview Press 1999). For the widespread existence of such a critique, see Lawrence M. Friedman,
Some Remarks on Crime, Violence, History and Culture, 69 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1121, 1134 (1998) ("Many
people think our current policies are rather hysterical reactions."). The standard complaints by legal
scholars about politics and the criminal law are hardly new, see, for example, Roscoe Pound, Criminal
Justice in America 65-69 (Henry Holt & Co. 1930); indeed, they can be found in the ancient stalwart,
Blackstone, who openly complained about the harshness of the bloody codification. William
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England vol. IV, **2.4 (U. Chi. Press 1979).
2. Richard Parker has provided a devastating portrait of this contempt in constitutional law
scholarship; much of the same argument could, and should, apply to criminal law scholarship. See
Richard D. Parker, "Here the People Rule": A Constitutional Populist Manifesto (Harv. U. Press 1994).
Although I make no claim to classify myself as a populist (something emerging as a "swear word" these
days in criminological circles), I do believe that contemporary criminal law scholarship too often veers
toward elitist self-congratulation. See e.g. Don Herzog, Poisoning the Minds of the Lower Orders
(Princeton U. Press 1998) (recognizing contempt as a form of hierarchical domination).
3. See e.g. Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal
Law, 91 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 829, 831 (2001) ("For some thirty years, American criminal law has
waged a war on crime.").
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whether the crime problem in America is at least in part a reflection of the
structure of American "crime politics."
4
How a nation deals out punishment reveals the character of its political and
social life-and this is true whether the laws are efficacious or not, whether they
respond to real problems or not. As Douglas Hay, the great historian, once wrote,
even when "bloody" codes are evaded or remain unenforced, crime legislation
supports the authority of an existing social and political order, the order that
continues to control the political process and recapitulate itself through that
5 6process.' In its recent Lawrence v. Texas decision, the Supreme Court came as
close to recognizing this as the Supreme Court has ever come. Justice Kennedy
noted that when the state backs its sanctions with violence, the powerful
legitimatizing force of that opinion is likely to repeat itself within the social order,'
justifying discrimination in private as well as public life. If this is right, then the
criminal law works overtime: its meaning in our life cannot be reduced to a matter
of arrests or sentences, it is reinforced even when there are few arrests and little
violence, when bloody codes last long after the wars that inspired them.
Analysis of the politics of crime legislation should have a far greater punch
in criminal law scholarship if for no other reason than that criminal law's politics
and legislation had such a real-life punch in the twentieth century. Wars on crime
and their excesses appear to have left their legislative traces throughout the
twentieth century. For example, crime legislation of the 1920s and 1930s has a
remarkable set of analogues in the 1980s and 1990s, 8 and that includes everything
from three-strikes laws, mandatory minimum sentences, attacks on disparities in
judicial sentencing, efforts to repeal the insanity defense, habitual sex offender
laws, and the expansion of vagrancy laws to cover gangs-to name only some of
the historical legislative efforts that have obvious modern legislative analogues. 9
4. To be sure, there are a bevy of scholars who see that the problem is related to politics, but very
few have engaged in sustained attention to the dynamics and incentives of legislation or political
institutions. One admirable, but too lonely, effort to address institutional incentives is Bill Stuntz's
pathological politics piece. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich.
L. Rev. 505 (2001). The standard critique of politics that often emerges from criminal law and
criminological work is really a critical aesthetics (i.e., efforts to describe the state in global terms as
penal-welfare, or penal-industrial, or neo-conservative etc.). I confess that I do not share the idea of
politics on which such claims rest-that politics is best understood as a description of party platforms
or a preferred set of end-state policies or outcomes, rather than a set of institutional structures and
relations that intensify or inhibit particular substantive policies or cultural tendencies. See V.F.
Nourse, Toward a New Constitutional Anatomy, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 835 (2004).
5. Douglas Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in Douglas Hay, Peter Linebaugh,
John G. Rule, E.P. Thompson & Cal Winslow, Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-
Century England 17 (Pantheon Bks. 1975).
6. 539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
7. 123 S. Ct. at 2482 ("When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that
declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the
public and in the private spheres.").
8. This claim certainly should not be read as one that these periods of history are alike; they are
extraordinarily different. Indeed, it is their extraordinary difference that may account for why we have
forgotten their legislative similarities. On the difficulties of the Depression in context, see infra notes
46-56 and accompanying text.
9. For a list of habitual offender laws operative during this period, see infra app. A. For
mandatory minimum sentences, see e.g. 1929 Cal. Stat. ch. 872, § 1; Baumes Act Upheld by Higher
[Vol. 39:925
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Perhaps, as Jim Whitman has recently suggested, there is something rather
persistent about the "harshness" of American criminal law, ° something built into
our political institutions or culture that accounts for this phenomenon, something
that has very little to do with the conventional explanation that this is all about
party politics, a new populism, neo-conservatism, or modernity."
What, you ask, has this to do with George Fletcher? Whether or not he
approves (and I have no idea whether he does), Fletcher is an inspiration in two
senses. Rethinking Criminal Law 2 ("Rethinking") refused to accept the scholarly
conventions of the day. Fletcher traded in the narrow and hegemonic focus of the
Model Penal Code for a rich comparative and historical project. However much I
have disagreed with Professor Fletcher-and I have-it is not debatable that he is
a scholar of great breadth, versed not only in the criminal law, but the law of the
world and the history of the Constitution. This erudition and breadth has
enriched his and our understanding of the criminal law. Indeed, it is precisely
because Fletcher rejected the narrow confines of a discipline-that only seems to
be getting narrower-that he began Rethinking with an injunction that remains
Court: Supreme Court Says Life Sentence is Mandatory for a Fourth Offense, 76 N.Y. Times 3 (Dec. 2,
1926); Want Crime Laws Made More Drastic: General Sessions Judges Urge Mandatory Life Term for
Second Degree Murder, 76 N.Y. Times 11 (Oct. 15, 1926). For cycling claims about sentencing, see Jay
S. Albanese, Concern About Variation in Criminal Sentences: A Cyclical History of Reform, 75 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 260 (1984). For a proposal for sentencing commissions to replace judicial
sentencing, see C. G. Poore, Revolutionary Plan for Handling Criminals: Governor Smith's Proposal to
Leave the Sentencing of Convicted Felons to a State Board Is Endorsed by Prison Authorities as a
Needed Reform, 77 N.Y. Times 7 (Dec. 18, 1927). For a legislative attack on the insanity defense, see
Sinclair v. State, 132 S. 581 (Miss. 1931). For the attempted expansion of vagrancy ordinances in the
1930s to cover "gangs" of racketeers, then called "public enemy" laws, see John J. Sullivan, The Public
Enemy Act of New York, 5 Brook. L. Rev. 62 (1935-36); the recent analogue is the kind of statute
debated in City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999). For sexual psychopath laws, both pre-WWII
and more modern, see Deborah W. Denno, Life Before the Modern Sex Offender Statutes, 92 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1317 (1998) (relying in part on Estelle B. Freedman, "Uncontrolled Desires": The Response to the
Sexual Psychopath, 1920-1960, 74 J. Am. Hist. 83 (1987)).
There are also parallels in social movements, such as the censorship campaigns of the early
1930s, which were based, as were similar campaigns in the 1980s, on claims that "culture" was to blame
for crime. As in most things historical, there are also contrary influences. There were movements in
state governments, for example, to make parole and probation real rather than illusory (because of
lack of funds or personnel); there was also a strong movement to have psychiatric clinics used by judges
and a significant elite movement against the death penalty. Perhaps upon further investigation, I shall
find greater disparity. At present, however, I find the legislative analogues rather remarkable, even if
they tell an incomplete story.
10. James Q. Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the Widening Divide between
America and Europe (Oxford U. Press 2003).
11. David Garland's fine book, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary
Society (U. Chi. Press 2001), emphasizes the role of modernity and populism in creating a culture of
"control." Malcolm Feeley, in his review of Garland, focuses on the neo-conservative strain of modern
politics. Malcolm M. Feeley, Crime, Social Order and the Rise of Neo-Conservative Politics, 7
Theoretical Criminology 111-30 (2003). In part, I think this is explained by the focus of these inquiries,
which is typically on the gap between politics and "expert" opinion, rather than legislation or the
legislative process itself. It certainly is true that, from a criminal justice "professional's" point of view,
the political world appears to have radically changed starting in 1970. The question remains whether
this focus-on the experts view-is the right one; and, more importantly, whether 1970 should be
considered the proper baseline for historical comparison.
12. George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Little, Brown & Co. 1978).
2004]
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unheeded by the academy: the criminal law is not only a matter of statistics or
doctrine, but it also raises important questions of political theory.13
Political theory should not, however, be a work of the abstract. Theory must
explain practice. Elsewhere, I have begun the project of "rethinking" criminal law
as it reflects the history of political theory. 4 Here I offer a brief and preliminary
take on another facet of this problem-the history of crime legislation. Because
of the ongoing nature of my project, all that I say here is truly provisional and
awaits a much lengthier defense. But in anticipation of that project, I offer the
preliminary results of a study of American crime politics in the twentieth century,
focused on one of the more prominent symbols of antipathy toward "wars on
crime," the "three-strikes" law. Three-strikes laws may be bad memories but they
are memories.5 I recount this history as description, not prescription. Instead, I
suggest that were we to take seriously the possibility of such patterns, we might
turn our attention to different kinds of solutions to standard criminal law debates.
CRIME POLITICS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
Scholars and popular pundits alike have perpetuated what may be a myth of
crime politics in the twentieth century: that it begins with Reagan or Bush or
perhaps Nixon and amounts to a fairly recent conspiracy. 16 Many are aware of the
Federal government's involvement in prohibition, but few remember that the
great liberal President, Franklin Roosevelt, waged a "war" on crime 7 (borrowing
the war metaphor," like much else, from Herbert Hoover).' 9  Almost every
13. Id. at xix ("Criminal law is a species of political and moral philosophy. Its central question is
justifying the use of the state's coercive power against free and autonomous persons."). Fletcher's own
work has, of course, focused mostly, but not exclusively, on the moral philosophy part of this equation.
14. See e.g. V.F. Nourse, Reconceptualizing Criminal Law Defenses, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1691 (2003).
15. The conventional wisdom among scholars is that three-strikes laws are a fairly recent political
phenomenon. See e.g. Franklin E. Zimring, Gordon Hawkins & Sam Kamin, Punishment and
Democracy: Three Strikes and You're Out in California 4 (Oxford U. Press 2001) (stating that three-
time loser laws existed prior to the late twentieth century but were not "an important issue in the
modern politics of law and order until the 1990s."). I confess that I, too, subscribed to the conventional
wisdom until I was forced to confront this history for purposes of another project. My critique should
be understood, then, with a sense of humility and in the spirit of intellectual discovery.
16. See e.g. Chambliss, supra n. 1, at 24 (suggesting that "tough on crime" began in the late 1960s
and early 1970s), 27 ("Crime has been raised to the level of a national crisis by a coalition of
interests ... including (1) conservative politicians concerned primarily with repressing civil rights
activism and political dissent.").
17. It was Roosevelt whose men, at least, were to regularly invoke the metaphor. See e.g. infra n.
19. The historical literature on this war is sparse. See Kenneth O'Reilly, A New Deal for the FBI: The
Roosevelt Administration, Crime Control, and National Security, 69 J. Am. Hist. 638 (1982) (O'Reilly
notes that standard treatments of the New Deal generally limit their treatment of the "crime war" to a
few paragraphs). Claire Bond Potter's work tends to focus, as does O'Reilly, on J. Edgar Hoover's
shenanigans, rather than on the history of crime politics and legislation of the period. See Claire Bond
Potter, War on Crime: Bandits, G-Men, and the Politics of Mass Culture (Rutgers U. Press 1998).
18. As in many things, Roosevelt inherited the battleground metaphor from his more maligned
predecessor, Herbert Hoover. By 1930, Hoover was insisting on a war against "gangsters," but his
"war" was largely rhetorical since he insisted that there was no federal power to intervene. See
President Demands War on Gangsters; Puts Duty on States: Calls for 'Awakening to Failure of Some
Local Governments to Protect Their Citizens,' 80 N.Y. Times 1 (Nov. 26, 1930). The war metaphor
appears to have percolated up into federal politics from the states. See e.g. A "Private War" on Crime:
Chicago's Battalions at Work, 80 N.Y. Times XX3 (Sept. 20, 1931); W.A. Warn, Gov. Roosevelt Asks
4
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president since has waged war on crime, whether a small one (as Eisenhower's
battle against juvenile delinquency) or a fierce one (like Kennedy's battle against
organized crime), one primarily focused on predators (as Reagan's), or one
disastrously focused on political enemies (as Nixon's). Clinton had a war and so
did Bush the elder. Indeed, there seems hardly a period in the twentieth
century-other than during an actual war-that the United States was not
warring against crime. 2
Firmer Laws to Aid Police War on Crime: Message Calls on Legislatures to Act Promptly on
Gangdom's Challenge to Society, 80 N.Y. Times 1 (Sept. 2, 1931) (the reference is to Franklin
Roosevelt as Governor of New York at the time); Public Aid Asked in War on Crime: National
Commission's Committee Meets at Home of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 75 N.Y. Times 23 (Nov. 20, 1925).
At the turn of the century, it was far more common for newspapers to speak of "crime waves" than
wars on crime, and this may well reflect intervening events, i.e., the First World War, which created a
consciousness of the way in which the public could be motivated during war. Indeed, the war
metaphor was widely used by Roosevelt's brain trust as a way to galvanize public opinion.
19. Joseph M. Proskauer, How Shall We Deal with Crime, 159 Harper's Mthly. Mag. 419, 419 (Sept.
1929) ("The President of the United States recently voiced the general belief that in our country's 'life
and property are relatively more unsafe than in any other civilized country in the world,' and an
equally general demand that a cure be found for this condition."); Roosevelt Asks Narcotic War Aid:
States Are Urged to Adopt Uniform Laws, Modeled on Harrison Act, 84 N.Y. Times 7 (Mar. 22, 1935);
A New Day in America for Justice and for the Law, Daily Oklahoman 8 (July 30, 1934) ("When the
history of the Roosevelt administration has been written, not the least significant, in fact, one of the
greatest of its achievements will have been the tremendous headway made against major crime by
Attorney General Cummings and his department of justice."); R. S. Thornburgh, The War on Crime:
The Justice Department Has Extended Its Activities, 83 N.Y. Times XX6 (Mar. 4, 1934); Senate Body
Strengthens Crime Laws, Enforcement: Senator Copeland Tells President of New Proposals, Wash. Post
1 (Dec. 17, 1933); Joseph B. Keenan, Uncle Sam Presses His New War on Crime: Joseph B. Keenan,
Who Heads the Government's Nation-Wide Drive against Racketeers and Kidnappers Tells of the
Federal Aims, the Need for New Laws, and the Forming of a Sound Plan for Widening the Campaign to
Relieve Gang-Ridden Communities, 82 N.Y. Times 1 (Aug. 20, 1933). None of this should be
misconstrued as an attempt to paint Roosevelt as unsympathetic to more liberal positions on penal
reform. See e.g. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address on Prison and Parole Problems (N.Y.C., Jan. 18,
1930), in The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt vol. 1, 376, 377 (Random House
1938) ("We at last understand that not philanthropy but mere common sense, and our own self-
protection require that these men [prisoners] should be released, chastened and reformed if possible,
but at least not rendered more vicious, more degraded, than when they were sentenced.").
20. To say that the rhetoric is the same is not to say that the policy is; nor am I making that claim.
Not all wars on crime are alike: some hit wide sections of the criminal code; others are quite narrowly
focused on enforcement. Some Presidents seem to relish war, and others accept it as a necessary evil.
And yet the persistence of the rhetoric suggests that any explanation of legislative harshness must
reach across party lines. On Clinton's war, see Chambliss, supra n. 1; on the George H.W. Bush war,
see Andrew Rosenthal, Taking Message on Road, Bush Pushes Crime Bill, 139 N.Y. Times A20 (Jan.
24, 1990); on Reagan's war, see Stuart Taylor Jr., New Attack on Crime: Reagan's Proposals Viewed as
More Likely to Appease Citizens Than Reduce Offenses, 131 N.Y. Times A28 (Sept. 30, 1981); Lee
Lescaze, Reagan Blames Crime on 'Human Predator,' Wash. Post A2 (Sept. 29, 1981); on Carter's war,
see Wayne King, Bell to Step Up War on Crime in Sunbelt: Attorney General Plans to Reopen Federal
Office in New Orleans to Curb Syndicate in South, 127 N.Y. Times 9 (Oct. 15, 1977); on Ford's war, see
James M. Naughton, President in Miami Pledges a 'Crusade' On Crime in Nation, 125 N.Y. Times 81
(Sept. 28, 1976); John M. Crewdson, President Urges Stiff New Laws on Violent Crime, 124 N.Y. Times
1 (June 20, 1975); on Nixon's war, see R. W. Apple Jr., Mitchell Says Congress Foils Nixon's Crime
War, 119 N.Y. Times 1 (Dec. 14, 1969); on Johnson's war, see John P. MacKenzie, President Outlines
Proposals to Fight Nationwide Crime, Wash. Post A6 (Mar. 10, 1966); Transcript of Johnson's Statement
on Signing Crime and Safety Bill, 117 N.Y. Times 23 (June 20, 1968); on Kennedy's war, see Robert
Kennedy Says U.S. Drive on Crime Is Curbing Hoodlums, 111 N.Y. Times 19 (Jan. 2, 1962); Alvin
Shuster, Kennedy Offers Plan to Combat Juvenile Crimes, 110 N.Y. Times 1 (May 12, 1961); Kennedy
Asks More for Drive on Crime, 110 N.Y. Times 24 (Mar. 7, 1961); on Eisenhower's war, see $3,000,000
Sought in War on Crime: President Acts to Aid States Curb Delinquency-Budget Also Helps the Aged,
104 N.Y. Times 22 (Jan. 18, 1955).
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One might dismiss this as mere symbolism or rhetorical excess if it weren't a
reflection of some legislative realities. To see this, let us look closely at the history
of legislation often used to symbolize modern "tough-on-crime" politics-three
strikes laws." It turns out that long before the Reagan-Bush era, there were
22political movements advocating three-strikes laws. Indeed, it is fair to say that
three-strikes laws-then called habitual offender laws-swept the nation in the
period from the mid-1920s until the mid-1930s. These laws were so popular that
manuals on them were created for debating societies. 23 One of the reasons that
these laws have gone unnoticed is because they went by a particular name, after
24their "inventor," a New York legislator named Caleb Baumes. To be sure, not
all legislatures adopted Baumes's mandatory-life solution, and some laws were
harsher than others, but this is a difference in degree, not kind. The conclusion
remains the same: contrary to widespread scholarly assumption, today's three-
strikes laws are not unprecedented. Between 1920 and 1945, laws mandating or
permitting life imprisonment for repeat felonies (two, three, or four prior
offenses) were passed or operative in more than twenty states.2
The politics of this first twentieth-century generation of three-strikes laws
was similar to that of later incarnations. Consider an account taken from the 1927
report of the New York State Crime Commission, which in standard self-
congratulatory tone described these laws as novel and extraordinarily effective.
The laws were dubbed a "legislative thunderbolt., 26 They had been so effective,
recounted one criminologist, that murders resulting from robberies were down by
over half and many criminals had simply "left ... for other states. 2 7 Given claims
that these laws resulted in the immediate reduction of crime,28 it was not surprising
that other states soon followed suit, either amending existing laws or enacting new
ones to provide for life imprisonment upon a third or fourth felony.29
21. My present study is limited to the twentieth century, although life imprisonment for repeaters is
much older. See e.g. 1822 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 176, § 5 (where a person is again convicted of a crime
punishable by hard labor, in addition to the penalty for the crime, he shall have 30 days solitary
confinement and seven years added to penalty; for the third offense, he shall have the same term of
solitary confinement, and shall be imprisoned for life). Moreover, that second felony increases were
prevalent at the beginning of the century is testified to by a series of cases in which the constitutionality
of such laws was tested before the First World War. See e.g. Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616
(1912); State v. Findling, 144 N.W. 142 (Minn. 1913); State v. Le Pitre, 103 P. 27 (Wash. 1909).
22. Note that this is a descriptive claim, not a prescriptive one; I am not advocating these laws.
23. The Baumes Laws 89 (Ref. Shelf Vol. 6, Series No. 3, Julia E. Johnsen compiler, H.W. Wilson
Co. 1929) (presenting "both sides" of the debates of contemporary controversy).
24. 1926 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 457, § 2,805.
25. Infra app. A (a list of sentencing laws for habitual offenders). A federal habitual offender law
was also enacted in 1929: the Jones-Stalker Act. 27 U.S.C. § 91 (repealed 1935); see The Jones-Stalker
Act, 15 Iowa L. Rev. 120 (1930).
26. Clayton Ettinger, The Problem of Crime 303 (Ray Long & Richard R. Smith, Inc. 1932).
27. Id. Should the reference to leaving for other states seem odd, it is important to remember that,
in that day and age, governors still issued "banishment paroles." Such a practice testifies to the ways in
which life and crime were once perceived as far more local than they are today.
28. The Baumes Laws, supra n. 23, at 114; Ettinger, supra n. 26, at 303.
29. See State v. Close, 287 P. 599 (Kan. 1930):
Our Legislature evidently had the above act [the Baumes law] before it. While it saw fit to
change the language and to enact a more severe law by providing life imprisonment for a
[Vol. 39:925
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These laws created their share of controversy, inciting disagreement not only
among lawyers and judges, but in the public as well.30 Just as we see with
mandatory sentencing guidelines today, judges who were forced to apply the
Baumes laws were sometimes resistant. Also as we see today, unjust applications
of these laws yielded public uproar and demands, in some cases, to limit the law's
applications, as in cases where grandmothers could find themselves sentenced to
jail for life for fairly trivial offenses.3' As they do today, commentators rightly
asked why legislatures were passing such laws given the existence of already harsh
penalties. 32  So, too, the experts doubted whether there was a real increase in
crime. 33 And it was only upon crisis-serious overcrowding and riots in New York
prisons-that the Baumes laws themselves were softened to a mandatory
minimum penalty. 34
Also not surprising was the way legislative sponsors turned the expertise of
the day in their favor, selectively applying criminology to support their political
claims. Representative Baumes, for example, explained that his laws were simply
"carrying into effect what criminologists, social workers, [and others] ... have
been urging for some years, namely, that our laws and our punishments should be
third conviction of felony, instead of a fourth conviction, as the New York law does, yet it
had in mind the same purpose and object as the New York Legislature, namely to provide
additional penalties for the commission of felonies subsequent to the first one, and thereby
strive to deter the criminally inclined from committing repeated felonies.
Id. at 602. See also T.V., Student Author, Habitual-Criminal Statutes and the Proposed
Pennsylvania Act, 77 Pa. L. Rev. 798, 801 (1928-1929) (noting that the proposed
Pennsylvania version was discretionary but was "based on certain sections of the New York
Penal Law, popularly known as the 'Baumes Law,' which has been the model for a number
of habitual-criminal statutes that have been adopted very recently in some of the states."
(emphasis omitted)).
30. See e.g. P.M., Student Author, Attempts to Combat the Habitual Criminal, 80 U. Pa. L. Rev. 565,
566 (1931-1932) ("When first put into effect in New York, there was considerable opposition to the law
on the part of the lower courts."); Minimum Jail Term Opposed by Judges: Plan to Fix One-Year
Sentence for First Offenders Called "Absurd and Illogical," 81 N.Y. Times 8 (Jan. 16, 1932); First-
Offender Law Declared 'Inhuman': Lewisohn Commission Reports That Severity of Indeterminate
Terms Defeats Purpose, 81 N.Y. Times 5 (Feb. 15, 1932). The law review commentary was also
generally negative. See e.g. J.A. Royce McCuaig, Modern Tendencies in Habitual Criminal Legislation,
15 Cornell L.Q. 62 (1930).
31. See e.g. Woman, 85, Escapes Life Term as Thief State Permits Mrs. La Touche to Plead Guilty to
Minor Charge Because of Her Age, 80 N.Y. Times 17 (Sept. 1, 1931).
32. As one commentator asked, if increased punishment for second crimes has been "in constant
application" since the early nineteenth century, "[i]t would seem strange... if the application of so old
a principle were going to solve the present problem when it had not already done so." See P.M., supra
n. 30, at 566.
33. See e.g. Experts Discover No 'Wave' of Crime: Hoover Research Group Finds No Gain Since
1925 in Minor and Many Major Categories, 82 N.Y. Times 17 (Feb. 27, 1933). Such expert skepticism
had been raised for some time. See e.g. The 'Crime Wave' and Public Hysteria, L. Notes 205 (Feb.
1922). It is worth noting at this point that the political science literature would predict that social
science expertise would be used opportunistically-that politicians pick and choose their experts to fit
their positions and that, in any event, those opinions will be molded to the felt political demands of the
times. In such a world "real" crime rates different from those used by crime "warriors" will only have
meaning if there is a real and meaningful political opposition to take them up.
34. Governor Roosevelt can be credited with this movement, although the result was that life
imprisonment was made discretionary and a minimum mandatory penalty appears to have been added.
See Two Views of Parole, 82 N.Y. Times 22 (Apr. 7, 1932); W.A. Warn, Gov. Roosevelt Asks Firmer
Laws to Aid Police War on Crime, 81 N.Y. Times 1 (Sept. 2, 1931).
2004]
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made to suit the criminal, not the crime. 35 Baumes insisted that the law was
compassionate:
3 6
They say that you should treat this man, that he is a sick man.... Now I say, by
the very same token, we should take care of this man though he is sick.... I would
be entirely satisfied if they will take this class of men and put them in an institution
and call it a protective detention institution, and keep them there for your
protection and mine and the protection of your family and mine.
37
Contrast this political and legislative story with the story that is typically told
by academics about the criminal law of the 1920s and 1930s. Most academics
remember it as the era when Sheldon Glueck won out over Joseph Beale, an era
of realism and the injection of social science into the legal curriculum, when
criminal law professors were happily recruited from the ranks of criminologists
38
and psychiatrists. This was the era in which Dean Pound excoriated the academy
for failing to study and reform the criminal law and in particular criminal
procedure. 39 This was the era of the great "studies" and "crime commissions."
Most criminal law scholars have heard of the Wickersham Commission and its
fourteen volumes.40 Few will recall that even before Wickersham there were
volumes issued in the states and President Coolidge's National Crime
Commission.4 ' The recommendations of these commissions were all quite
forward-looking, often focusing on streamlining criminal procedure, opposing the
35. The Baumes Laws, supra n. 23, at 89.
36. Id. at 99 ("The theory of the Fourth Offender Act is not punishment at all, but it is protection to
the public.").
37. Id. at 104 (quoting Caleb B. Baumes, Chairman of the New York State Crime Commission in
the 1920s). Baumes was correct in stating that during this period some criminologists, following
insistently the theory that the focus should be on the criminal rather than the crime, advocated
preventive detention.
38. Professor Beale, author of one of the leading criminal law casebooks of the day, was the butt of
many of the realists' charges. They called it Bealism. In 1930, Sheldon Glueck was one of the most
famous criminal law professors in the country; his social scientific studies of large samples of offenders
seemed, at the time, to open the way for finding the key to rehabilitation. See Sheldon Glueck &
Eleanor T. Glueck, One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents: Their Treatment by Court and Clinic (Harv.
U. Press 1939).
39. Pound, supra n. 1, at 210-11 (1930) ("Unfortunately the backwardness of juristic science with
respect to criminal justice is of long standing.... Nowhere is the need of the highest type of juristic
writing so acute as in the criminal law. Nowhere does there seem so little prospect of it.").
40. Natl. Commn. L. Observance & Enforcement, Report on Criminal Procedure (Series No. 8, U.S.
Govt. Printing Off. 1931); Natl. Commn. L. Observance & Enforcement, Report on Crime and the
Foreign Born (Series No. 10, U.S. Govt. Printing Off. 1931); Nat]. Commn. L. Observance &
Enforcement, Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement (Series No. 11, U.S. Govt. Printing Off.
1931).
41. The crime commission movement in the states predated Wickersham by some years. See Esther
Conner, Crime Commission and Criminal Procedure in the United States since 1920: A Bibliography, 21
Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology 129 (1930-31). The New York Commission yielding the Baumes law
was seen as a model by some. See e.g. Wants All States to Seek Crime Data: Richard W. Child Cites
New York Commission's Work to Show Its Aid to Legislation, 76 N.Y. Times 40 (Mar. 14, 1927). The
various state and local studies are listed in Conner; the prior Cleveland study is probably the best
known to legal scholars because it was edited by Roscoe Pound and Felix Frankfurter. Cleveland
Foundation, Criminal Justice in Cleveland: Reports of the Administration of Criminal Justice in
Cleveland, Ohio (Roscoe Pound & Felix Frankfurter eds., Patterson Smith 1922).
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"third-degree," and impaling crass public assumptions such as the idea, then quite
prevalent, that the "foreign-born" were responsible for crime.42
To remember this story is to focus on intellectual history (indeed, the
intellectual history that tends to include academics). For the people of the 1920s
and 1930s, crime was a part of real life,43 as real as machine gun shootings,
motorcars, and children being gunned down in the streets. This fear was in part a
panic-fear of crime always is. But in this, there is less that is different about
crime and crime legislation than is conventionally thought. Laws are frequently
passed because of panic or even sheer anecdote-because of a flood or a
hurricane, because of the impending close of government, or because of a terrorist
bombing. This exaggerates, but only a bit, particularly if one remembers how
extraordinarily difficult it is to pass any piece of legislation, how easy it is to block
legislation (a single vote may be enough), and how fear is a powerful galvanizing
factor in many political matters-including matters of civil rights, global warming,
cold wars, and even the United Nations."
In the early 1930s, there were some reasons to panic, and they were more
than the public celebrities we remember or the film noir they inspired. At the
height of the Depression scare, two-and-a-half-year-old Dorette Zeitlow was
"snatched" by a thirteen year old and left to die in an icehouse outside Chicago.
Ten thousand mobbed her funeral.45 In April 1934, five thousand men searched
the Arizona desert for the body of six-year-old June Robles, who had been
kidnapped and buried alive in a box (she survived).46 In May, in Toledo, the
National Guard battled six thousand striking workers, and in Oklahoma City,
twelve hundred men and women stormed the relief offices.47 Six months earlier,
in San Jose, California, a mob lynched two white kidnappers, and the Governor
48pardoned them on the spot, thanking them for their vengeance. Is it a surprise in
this world that federalism objections to national intervention (which were made)
42. See e.g. Report on Criminal Procedure, supra n. 40; Report on Crime and the Foreign Born, supra
n. 40; Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, supra n. 40.
43. Editorial, A Change Toward Criminals, Muskogee Daily Phoenix 18 (May 4, 1934) ("Time was
when a murder in another locality did not strike home.").
44. These facts are a staple not only of legislative studies but also of the law of legislation. See
Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path ": A Theory of Judicial
Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1447, 1476 (1995).
45. Throngs Riot, Fight to See Bier of Baby: Morbid Mob Tears Up Wreaths at Funeral of Chicago
Child, Daily Oklahoman 1 (Apr. 14, 1934).
46. 1,000 Armed Men in Vengeful Hunt for Kidnapped Girl: Canyons, Desert Scanned as Second
Note Proves to Be Spurious, Tulsa Daily World 1 (Apr. 27, 1934).
47. Nine Arrested as 1,200 Rush Relief Bureau: Tear Gas Bombs Break Up Crowd Converging upon
Commissary, Daily Oklahoman 1 (May 22, 1934); Savage Strike Riot Flares Anew, Muskogee Daily
Pheonix 1 (May 5, 1934).
48. Gov. Rolph Backs San Jose Lynching As Kidnap Warning: He Will Pardon Any Arrested-
Favors Turning Over to Mob Convicted Abductors, 83 N.Y. Times 1 (Nov. 28, 1933); "A Fine Lesson,"
83 N.Y. Times 20 (Nov. 28, 1933); Rolph Statement Stirs Storm Here: Civil Liberties Union Wires Stand
Makes Him a Party to Lynching, 83 N.Y. Times 3 (Nov. 28, 1933).
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were given short shrift, and that Congress in May of 1934 put its final stamp of
approval on expansive new federal criminal laws in two hours on a Saturday?
49
My point in recounting this is not to embrace the stories of victims-nor to
glorify "tough on crime"-but to suggest that there is more to the meaning of the
criminal law than some imagine. In politics, the criminal law is always about order
on a larger scale; it is about the nature of government itself. Although I think this
generally true, it is quite evident in the period in which many of these laws arose.
Remember, this was the Depression, a world where many were literally eating out
of garbage cans and a quarter of the nation was out of work. ° Many citizens
during the early 1930s believed democracy was dead. By 1935, radical popular
movements, led by Huey Long and Father Coughlin, seemingly bent on
"revolution," had rounded up millions of supporters." In such a world, crime
symbolized grave disorder and even political collapse.
If crime legislation is about order, it is because crime carries the risk of
rebellion. As Eric Hobsbawm showed us, the public may well understand the
bandit as a rebel,52 and if there was an American age of the criminal as a bandit,
the thirties was it, with its Bonnies and Clydes, Machine Gun Kellys and
Dillingers. Perhaps then it really should be no surprise to learn that when
Franklin Roosevelt heard that movie audiences were cheering public enemies, he
reminded the country that they were in fact at war on crime. 3 He and other
Presidents of this century have understood that crime legislation is a powerful
symbol of public and political order and stability. Roosevelt may not have had
any enthusiasm for his crime war (it appears to have been marshaled by his
attorney general, Homer Cummings,5 4 who also helped to push the terrible idea to
pack the Supreme Court55), but Roosevelt had enough enthusiasm to campaign on
56
the idea of "security," linking social security to the war on crime.
49. Dillinger Causes House to Pass 10 Anti-Crime Bills: Sweeping Power Voted to Federal Agents,
with Roosevelt Applying the Goad, Muskogee Daily Phoenix 1 (May 6, 1934). The "two hours on a
Saturday" is journalistic (indeed, it is taken from newspaper accounts at the time). Although reporters
like to make much of speed in these matters, this was a two-hour debate on a conference committee
report; crime measures along these lines had been debated for some time by the spring of 1934.
50. See e.g. 78 Cong. Rec. 449 (1934) (comment by Sen. Royal S. Ferguson) ("There are places in
America where orderly government has disappeared, where the underworld is in control. I do not wish
to indulge in any extravagant statement, but I am here to say that unless America shall be aroused the
underworld gangster will come more and more into control in the United States.").
51. Alan Brinkley, Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin and the Great Depression 6-7
(Vintage Bks. 1983) (quoting General Hugh S. Johnson).
52. Eric Hobsbawm, Bandits (New Press 2000).
53. See e.g. New Dillinger Killings Stir the President and He Asks Quick Action on Crime Bills, 83
N.Y. Times 1 (Apr. 24, 1934); Roosevelt Opens Attack on Crime, Signing Six Bills as 'Challenge':
Extending Federal Jurisdiction to Interstate Gang Offenses, with Death for Some Kidnappers, He Calls
on People to Join in War on Underworld, 83 N.Y. Times 1 (May 19, 1934).
54. See Crime War 'Real' Asserts Cummings, 83 N.Y. Times 3 (Sept. 12, 1933); Wide Power Asked in
Drive on Crime, 84 N.Y. Times 11 (Feb. 20, 1934); Federal 'Teeth' Asked in Gang War, 84 N.Y. Times
46 (Mar. 20, 1934).
55. See Marian C. McKenna, Franklin Roosevelt and the Great Constitutional War: The Court-
Packing Crisis of 1937 (Fordham U. Press 2002) (recounting Homer S. Cumming's involvement in the
court-packing plan based on newly discovered evidence).
56. See e.g. President Offers Kansans Security as New Deal Fact: School Expenditures the Last Place
to Economize, He Tells 20,000 in Kansas City, 86 N.Y. Times 1, 16 (Oct. 14, 1936) (stating that
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My point is not to make Roosevelt a crime-warrior; rather, it is to insist upon
considering the idea that the crime legislation of the twentieth century-the real
politics-has been remarkably predictable. And that it has been predictable
because of an obvious structural problem: no one is "for" crime and thus the
political debate remains invariably one-sided.57 Criminal law scholars must
consider the possibility that there is nothing recent about the harshness of
American crime politics or legislation, that the politics of crime that academics
abhor is not a temporary phenomenon, nor one limited to a particular political
party, nor one that follows fashions against the "welfare" state.58 Perhaps it is
built into American political culture, as Whitman's cross-cultural comparison
suggests.59  Or, as I have a hunch, our political culture of crime-no doubt
imagined in the form of rugged individualism and manliness-is exacerbated and
amplified by the very political structure we otherwise cherish.
There is every reason to believe that American crime politics is likely to be
different from crime politics in other countries, and that is because our system of
government has no precise analogue anywhere in the world. Its system of
federalized control coupled with the separation of powers (its presidential, non-
parliamentary system) makes politics a highly redundant, but also highly
competitive, affair. It means that, typically, our government is perpetually
ineffectual-that it is very hard to get agreement on any particular policy, much
harder than in parliamentary systems where political parties hold more sway, and
can effectively control, rather than compete, with the administration. It also
means that crisis legislation, in all matters, is likely to have greater importance as a
way to push toward agreement. (What, after all, is the war metaphor but a means
to galvanize public opinion, to suggest the need for action and sacrifice?)
All of this is made even harder by the fact that there are two competing
governments, each with its separate powers, and here I refer to the existence of
the states. States must compete with the nation for voters' attention and
allegiance. In the nineteenth century, crime was largely a local and state affair.
With the institution of mass communication-which allowed fear of crime to
spread across the nation almost instantaneously-the stage was set for federal
intervention on a substantial scale, something that began at the turn of the century
and became politically irresistible in the wake of the kidnapping scare of the early
1930s. This structural shift-which is unique to the twentieth century-increased
political competition. And increased competition in a world of one-sided-or
"security" was the theme of the campaign in Kansas and "[u]nder the heading of 'security' he grouped
not only old-age pensions and unemployment insurance but the Federal war on crime.").
57. This suggests that the real question to ask may be not "why harshness?," but "why mildness?"
My suspicion is that religion played an important role in restraining American crime policy in the
nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, as I indicated, when fears of government itself were
stronger than fears of one's citizens (as exemplified in the Watergate/Vietnam era), then there may
have been more political will to restrain government actors.
58. If this is right, and admittedly my research remains provisional, then one must consider all sorts
of seemingly contrarian propositions. For example, wars on crime may turn out to be as consistent
with welfare-state-building as welfare-state-opposition.
59. Whitman, supra n. 10.
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perhaps more accurately, no-debate (criminals, remember, cannot vote) is likely
to yield increasingly extreme legislation. Only when the fear turns inward, when
people are more afraid of the police than they are of their fellow citizens' use of
violence, is the harshness countered. Then the politics changes abruptly, in
punctuated fashion, and only temporarily (as in the 1960s and 1970s). 60 My hunch,
then, is that criminal law harshness is the norm, not the exception, of twentieth-
century American crime politics.
61
To recognize this is not, in my view, to embrace despair, and certainly not to
justify a return to "original" solutions. Simply because a few states in 1930s still
whipped their prisoners, and one even tried to use them as mules, does not mean
that we should return to such a tradition. It is to say that, if one is looking for real
solutions, rather than self-congratulation, one will have to look in the very places
that criminal law scholars fear to tread-inside politics and political institutions.
There are obvious candidates for consideration. For example, scholars might
consider the problem of specific legislative malfunctions and informational
failures. They might turn their attention to the predictable information failures
that occur when legislative bodies attempt to ensnare the big fish and instead
catch the small fry. For it seems clear, both from the debates and the results, that
legislators pay little attention to what every first year law student knows about the
ancillary liabilities of aiding and abetting and conspiracy. Such information
failures are quite common in legislatures, in large part because of what I call the
"generality gap" between politics and law. Turn on C-SPAN and you will not see
legislators reading statutes into the camera; they are reading speeches, speeches
whose audience is the electorate, not the experts. During debate, the complexities
of legislation are often lost, leaving details crucial to lawyers ignored. Such gaps
are ameliorated, in the standard case, by the incentives of citizens and interest
groups who oppose laws to offer conflicting views and information and make them
felt in pre-debate committee venues. But in a world where there is really no
opposition, there is little incentive for anyone to raise the problem that the
kingpin who is legislated against will turn out to be the courier.
Perhaps more importantly, scholars may want to consider even deeper
institutional reforms: one way to fight institutional malfunction in government is
to harness the incentives of a competing institution. Ever since John Ely wrote
decades ago, it has become conventional constitutional wisdom that political
malfunction is a reason to consider stronger judicial intervention in the legislative
arena. 62 Why not in the substantive criminal law? After all, the state is depriving
citizens of their liberty. If harms to minorities deserve heightened judicial
scrutiny, why not the claims of people who, if they are convicted, cannot vote and
60. I offer this hypothesis in deliberately conclusory fashion with the hope that it will in fact be
taken as it is offered, as a hypothesis, while I complete the much larger study which is underway.
61. 1 do not mean to slight here various cultural explanations; it also seems true to me that the
decline of religion, and an institutionalized ideal of mercy, are factors of at least equal importance to
structural changes. Those structural changes, it seems to me, are likely to exacerbate such a cultural
shift.
62. John H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 135 (Harv. U. Press 1980).
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are termed "civilly dead"? One need not transform every criminal case into a
constitutional case; one might simply, as William Stuntz argues, use statutory
interpretation as a lever in this battle.63  In constitutional law, courts and
commentators have become quite accustomed to super-clear statement rules 64 and
have felt themselves quite free to assert their power in the case of repeated
political malfunction and structural concern. Why not consider such intervention
to refuse to apply irrational penalty structures (ones that could only be passed into
law in a world where there was no one to point up the obvious problems)? Even if
such a rule would not prevent excess, it might aid in political transparency,
increased saliency, and might even reduce the political costs of opposing such
legislation.
Whatever the merit of these proposals, it does seem to me to be time to
begin anew in the criminal law. History demands as much from those of us who
have the privilege to write and teach these matters. We have spent almost an
entire century looking for the "causes" for crime that have never been uncovered
to everyone's satisfaction; 65 we have spent almost an entire century believing that
the "science" of real numbers and facts will constrain legislatures when it has not;
we have spent almost an entire century theorizing about retribution and
deterrence and punishment only to discover what we should have known-that
these ideas partake of the dangers of "semantic ascent" (they are full of normative
contradiction because they are described at such a high level of abstraction).66
Perhaps we might want to consider criminal laws from a different angle. But this
can only occur if we, like Fletcher, look beyond the standard boundaries of the
discipline, take risks, and "rethink" our assumptions about the criminal law.
63. Stuntz, supra n. 4.
64. One might call this "super-lenity," on the theory that the rule of lenity requires courts to
construe statutes in favor of defendants. Clear statement rules, however, do not typically focus on all
statutory matters (as does the rule of lenity) but rather on particular questions that reflect
constitutional anxieties, particularly structural anxieties. In this case, the argument would be that the
kind of penalty structures created shift powers from the judiciary to prosecutors, increasing the relative
risk to individuals or what I have called minoritarian risk.
65. It may well be that we will only find the causes of crime when we find the "causes" of emotion.
See James Gilligan, Violence 45-55 (Vintage Bks. 1997).
66. See Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of "Just" Punishment, 96 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 843 (2001) (arguing that "retributivism fails to satisfy its own criteria of just punishment");
Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 413 (1999) (suggesting that
deterrence is a political idiom reflecting radically-conflicting social and cultural meanings); Nourse,
supra n. 14 (suggesting that retributivism and deterrence have conflicting meanings as both limits and
permissions and thus are unhelpful in rejecting or accepting any particular doctrine).
2004]
13
Nourse: Rethinking Crime Legislation: history and Harshness
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2003
TULSA LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX A
1. 1927 Cal. Sess. Laws ch. 634, 1066, (amending 1923 Cal. Sess. Laws ch.
111, 237); Cal. Penal Code § 644 (1931) (mandatory life sentence after third
specified felony conviction).
2. 1929 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 85, § 3, 310; Colo. Stat. Ann. § 553, 1164-65
(1935) (mandatory life sentence after third specified felony conviction).
3. 1927 Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws § 7107 (1929); Fla. Stat. Ann, § 775.10 (West
1944) (mandatory life sentence after third felony or attempted felony
conviction).
4. 1923 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 109, § 1, 139; Idaho Code Ann. § 19-2414
(1932) (discretionary life sentence upon third felony conviction).
5. 1927 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 191, § 1, 247; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 21-107a
(1935) (mandatory life sentence after second felony conviction).
6. 1929 Mich. Pub. Acts 24, § 12, 53, amending 1927 Mich. Pub. Acts 175, §
12, 325; Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.12 (1948) (mandatory life sentence after
third specified felony conviction).
7. 1927 Minn. Sess. Laws ch. 236, § 2, 338; Minn Stat. § 610.29(1) (1941)
(mandatory life sentence if the fourth felony may be punishable by life
sentence).
8. 1927 N.J. Sess. Laws ch. 263, 483; N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2:103-10 (1937)
(discretionary life sentence after third conviction).
9. 1929 N.M. Sess. Laws ch. 58, § 3, 83; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 42-1603 (1941)
(mandatory life sentence after third felony conviction).
10. 1926 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 457, § 2, 805 (mandatory life sentence after
third felony conviction).
11. 1927 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 126, § 2, 158; N.D. Rev. Code § 12-0621 (1943)
(discretionary life sentence after third felony conviction).
12. 1929 Ohio Sess. Laws H.R. 8, § 2, 40; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. § 13744-2
(Anderson 1939) (mandatory life sentence after third specified felony).
13. 1927 Or. Sess. Laws ch. 334, § 3, 432; Or. Code Ann. § 13-2803 (1930)
(mandatory life sentence after third felony conviction).
14. 1929 Pa. Sess. Laws 373, § 2, 854; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 922 (West
1936) (discretionary life sentence after third specified felony).
15. 1927 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 119, § 2, 143; S.D. Comp. Laws § 3613 (1929)
(discretionary life sentence after third felony conviction).
16. 1939 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 22, § 2, 106-107; 7 Williams Tenn. Code Ann. §
11863.2 (Supp. 1952) (mandatory life sentence after third specified felony).
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17. 1927 Vt. Sess. Laws 128, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 41, § 8616 (1947) (mandatory
life sentence after third conviction).
18. 1939 W. Va. Acts ch. 26, art. 11, § 19; W. Va. Code § 6130 (1943)
(mandatory life sentence after second conviction).
19. 1937 Wyo. Laws ch. 68, § 2, 103; Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 9-110 (1945)
(mandatory life sentence after third conviction).
The following 6 states had laws mandating life after 4 or fewer convictions in
force from 1920 until 1940 but these laws were likely to have been enacted at an
earlier date:
20. Tex. Penal Code Ann. art. 63 (1925) (mandatory life sentence upon
third felony conviction).
21. Ind. Stat. Ann. § 2339 (1926); 1907 Ind. Sess. Laws, ch. 82, § 1, 109
(mandatory life sentence after second felony conviction).
22. Carroll's Ky. Stat. Ann. § 1130 (1930) (mandatory life sentence upon
third felony conviction); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 431.190 (1942).
23. Mont. Rev. Code Ann. § 11594 (1921) (mandatory life sentence upon
second conviction if the subsequent offense is punishable by a life
sentence).
24. OK. Stat. art. 6, § 1818 (1931) (mandatory life sentence upon second
felony conviction if the subsequent offense is punishable by a life sentence).
25. Wash. Rev. Stat. § 2286 (1932) (mandatory life after second felony or
fourth specified lesser crime).
This is not a complete list of all relevant state statutes as this research
remains in progress; it should be noted that other states during this period, and
earlier, had habitual offender statutes, with penalties less than life sentences.
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